2017-08-30 | Uniqueness of the equilibrium in first-price auction with discrete distributions (Zihe Wang)

2017-08-30   


Abstract

First-price auction is widely used in government contracts and auctions for mining leases. I consider the Bayesian Nash equilibrium (BNE) in the first-price auction in the asymmetric independent private values model. Maskin and Riley (2000) proved that BNE always exists for any distribution. Lebrun (2006) proved that BNE is unique when the continuous distribution functions are strictly log-concave at the highest lower extremity of the supports. In this talk, I will show the uniqueness of BNE when the distribution is discrete without any distribution assumption.


Our results are enabled by new uniform convergence bounds for hypotheses classes under product measures. Our bounds result in exponential savings in sample complexity compared to bounds derived by bounding the VC dimension and are of independent interest.


Time

2017年8月30日(周三)  13:00 ~ 14:00


Speaker

Zihe Wang, Shanghai University of Finance and Economics


Room

信息管理与工程学院602室

上海财经大学

上海市杨浦区武东路100号